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   Transition countries hoping to join the European Union are in the process of introducing
western-type anti-discrimination policies aimed at reducing the gender wage gap. The efficacy
of these policies depends on the relative size of the gap￿s elements they target; therefore, it is
important to quantify these parts. In this paper, large matched employer-employee data sets
from the Czech Republic and Slovakia are used to provide such detailed gender wage gap
decomposition. The results, based on 1998 data, suggest that various forms of employment
segregation are related to over one third of the overall pay difference between genders in both
countries. In the non-public sector, however, almost two thirds of the total gap remains
attributable to the individual￿s sex, suggesting much of the gap is due to violations of the equal
pay policy.
Abstrakt
   Transformačn￿ ekonomiky doufaj￿c￿ ve vstup do EvropskØ unie zavÆděj￿ prÆvn￿ œpravy
podporuj￿c￿ rovnØ  zachÆzen￿ s mu￿i a ￿enami na trhu prÆce. Ka￿dØ z těchto opatřen￿ ovlivňuje
jin￿ zdroj (př￿činu) platov￿ch rozd￿lů mezi mu￿i a ￿enami. Je proto důle￿itØ kvantifikovat
relativn￿ zÆva￿nost těchto zdrojů. V tomto člÆnku je proto proveden detailn￿ rozklad platov￿ch
rozd￿lů podle pohlav￿ s pomoc￿ rozsÆhlØho datovØho souboru z ČeskØ Republiky a Slovenska z
roku  1998. V￿sledky naznačuj￿, ￿e segregace ￿en do n￿zkopř￿jmov￿ch povolÆn￿ a firem
zapř￿čiňuje přibli￿ně jednu třetinu celkovØho platovØho rozd￿lu. Mimo rozpočtov￿ sektor ale
nelze zb￿vaj￿c￿ dvě t řetiny vysvětlit rozd￿ln￿mi charakteristikami mu￿ů a ￿en (např.
vzdělÆn￿m) ani rozd￿ln￿mi charakteristikami jejich zaměstnavatelů (např. průmyslov￿m
odvětv￿m firem), co￿ naznačuje poru￿ovÆn￿ pravidla stejnØ mzdy za stejnou prÆci.
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The legislation of most transition economies (TEs) has long included fundamental clauses about
equality of men and women. Until recently, however, western-style anti-discrimination labor market
policies were either not introduced or enforced.1 Since one of the pre-requisites of accession to the
European Union is harmonization of legislation, many TEs, including the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, are now in the process of enacting policies of comparable worth, equal pay, and equal
employment opportunity.2
Each of these anti-discrimination policies aﬀects a diﬀerent source of the overall wage gap
between men and women. The comparable worth policy attempts to equalize wage rates across
occupations and job cells of equal worth, where a job cell is de￿ned as a group of workers with the
same occupation within a ￿rm and ￿worth￿ is de￿ned in terms of the job￿s skill requirements and
other attributes. The equal pay provisions target wage diﬀerences within job cells. Finally, the equal
employment opportunity clauses aﬀect all forms of segregation￿the discriminatory hiring, ￿ring, and
promotion practices that result in high concentration of women in low-paying occupations, ￿rms, or
job cells. Which of the anti-discrimination policies is the most important in narrowing the gender
wage gap therefore depends on the relative size of the gap￿s elements.
Occupational segregation has been the subject of much research, e.g. Killingsworth (1990) and
Macpherson and Hirsh (1995), which ￿nds that not only female, but also male wages are lower in
predominantly female occupations. Johnson and Solon (1986) suggest that employer segregation
in the U.S. may be more important than occupational segregation, implying that the comparable
worth policy applied within ￿rms has little eﬀect. Further, Blau (1977) and Bielby and Baron
1The constitutions of TEs typically include a ￿no discrimination in remuneration￿ clause and in some countries,
e.g. Ukraine, Estonia, and Hungary, the Labor Law guarantees ￿equality of labor rights.￿ However, these rights
are not speci￿ed in detail and not enforced in courts. For example, until recently Czech employers stated gender
requirements when posting hiring ads, etc.
2These amendments of the Czech Labor Code and Wage Law were legally enacted in 2000. In Slovakia, similar
amendments are expected to become legally enacted in 2002.
1(1984) point to the presence of signi￿cant job-cell segregation.3 Matched employer-employee data-
sets now allow researchers to simultaneously condition on the extent of all of these types of gender
segregation when estimating the eﬀect of gender on wages. See Groshen (1991), Carrington and
Troske (1998), and Bayard et al. (1999) for analysis of such data from the U.S. The results of the
last study, based on a large data set covering all industries and occupations, suggest that both the
eﬀect of the individual￿s sex within a job cell and various forms of gender segregation are important
in accounting for the total U.S. gender pay gap.
Even though the pre-accession TEs are now introducing anti-discrimination labor market poli-
cies potentially aﬀecting gender employment segregation, little is known about the importance of
segregation for the gender wage gap in these countries. There is a wealth of research studying
the evolution of gender-speci￿c wages during early transition when wage diﬀerentiation increased
dramatically and when labor force participation rates decreased from the arti￿cial high levels of
the communist era (see Section 2). With one exception, however, this research did not focus on the
eﬀects of occupational segregation, and no evidence exists on the contribution to the wage gap of
within-establishment and job-cell segregation.
Ogloblin (1999) analyzes gender pay diﬀerences and occupational segregation in Russia during
1994-1996 and concludes that most of the total gap is attributable to occupational segregation, a
legacy of the Soviet era. Due to the uniformity of labor market practice across the former communist
countries, one could expect segregation to have a sizeable eﬀe c to ng e n d e rw a g ed i ﬀerences in other
TEs as well. Further, understanding and quantifying sources of the wage gap helps to identify
the policies most relevant for reducing the gap. In particular, to combat the segregation-related
gender pay gap, it is crucial to understand whether it arises within or across ￿rms. It is therefore
important to guide the enforcement of the newly introduced anti-discrimination policies in the TEs
by decomposing the overall wage gap into its parts which are attributed to detailed forms of gender
segregation and to violations of the equal pay act.
3A recent survey of the gender-related economic literature is provided in Altonji and Blank (1999).
2This paper provides such a decomposition using matched employer-employee data sets includ-
ing hourly wage records of almost 1 million Czech and Slovak workers in 1998. I follow Groshen
(1991) and Bayard et al. (1999) and describe the wage structure using wage regressions condition-
ing not only on the female dummy, but also on the fraction of women within a given occupation,
establishment or job cell. The estimated coeﬃcients are used together with the mean diﬀerences
in explanatory variables by gender to calculate a standard Oaxaca-Blinder mean wage gap decom-
position. The regression estimates account for the clustering of regression residuals by ￿rms and
for coeﬃcient heterogeneity across sample strata. To my knowledge this is the ￿rst analysis of the
gender wage gap in transition countries using a matched employer-employee data set and captur-
ing within-establishment segregation eﬀects. Finally, the paper oﬀers separate policy implications
for the unregulated non-public sector4 and for the budgetary public sector, where wages are set
a c c o r d i n gt ow a g eg r i d ss p e c i ￿ed by the government administration.
2. Background and Previous Literature
At ￿rst glance, the level of gender equality under communism has been impressive. Indeed, the
equality of men and women was one of the proclaimed advantages of the communist system. The
system supporting this equality was, however, authoritative, rather than rights-based. The ￿full
employment￿ policy stipulated that all able-bodied individuals had to (go to) work and wages and
prices were set so that only one income per family meant near poverty. Most women therefore
worked,5 but they also had full access to education and health care. As many other ￿rights￿
imposed under central planning, the right to gender equality resulted in what has been sometimes
4The non-public sector includes private and state-owned enterprises as opposed to the budgetary public sector,
where wages are funded directly from the state budget.
5Labor force participation rates were arti￿cially high for both sexes under central planning and declined during
early transition. The decline was somewhat faster for women than for men (see Ham et al., 1999, and the references
therein). In 1998, the Czech (Slovak) participation rate for ages 15-64 was 80 (73) percent for men and 64 (60) percent
for women.
3termed an ￿allergy to feminism.￿ See Ogloblin (1999) and Brainerd (2000), who provide a detailed
discussion of the relevant institutional background on gender in communism.
In accordance with the oﬃcial policy of gender equality, pay diﬀerentiation based on gender was
restricted under central planning. Wages were set according to industry-speci￿c wage grids varying
only with the diﬃculty of the job and with the worker￿s education and experience, not gender
(M￿nich et al., 1999). Even though the possibility of gender wage discrimination was severely
limited in communist Czechoslovakia by the imposition of these wage grids, gender wage gaps were
substantial. In 1988, women earned on average about 70 percent of men￿s wages (Ham et al., 1995)
and these diﬀerences are generally attributed to discriminatory promotion practices and to the
segregation of women into low-paying occupations.
Following the collapse of communism, wage regulations were quickly abolished and a wealth
of studies summarized by Svejnar (1999) documents a rapid increase in wage dispersion during
transition, underlined in part by increases in returns to education. Skill-related wage diﬀerentials
kept rising even in the mid to late 1990s, but the process seems to have converged to a relatively
stable wage structure at least in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Filer et al., 1999). Today,
wage grids, restraining gender pay diﬀerentiation, are used only in the budgetary sector (public
administration, education, and health), and room for pay discrimination is open in the unregulated
non-budgetary sector. This is likely to change with the introduction and enforcement of the western-
style anti-discrimination policies.
The literature investigating the wage position of women in transition is rapidly growing. Most of
the existing work studies the impact of early pro-market reforms on relative female wages. See, e.g.,
Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) for Slovenia, Hunt (1998) for East Germany, and Newell and Reilly
(1996), Brainerd (1998), Ogloblin (1999) and Reilly (1999) for Russia. Brainerd (2000) contrasts
female relative wages under communism and early-reform in seven TEs. She shows that during
early transition the gender wage gap diminished in Eastern Europe but widened in Russia and
Ukraine where women ￿have been penalized by the tremendous widening of the wage distribution.￿
4On the other hand, Newell and Reilly (2000) suggest that the gender wage gap has been relatively
stable through the 1990s in a number of TEs.
Ogloblin￿s 1999 study is closely related to the present research in its attempt to capture the
eﬀect of occupational segregation on wages. Using a nationally representative Russian household
survey from 1992-1996, he ￿nds, similar to Newell and Reilly (1996), that the gender pay gap
cannot be explained by gender diﬀerences in education and experience alone. Ogloblin then further
conditions on industry and ￿rm ownership dummies as well as on a class of occupational dummies,
capturing overwhelmingly ￿male￿ and ￿female￿ occupations. He ￿nds that these additional controls
account for over 80% of the wage gap and singles out occupational segregation as the most important
determinant of gender earnings diﬀerentials in Russia.
This study extends the existing literature by controlling for within-establishment forms of work-
place segregation and by oﬀering recent and policy-targeted evidence on the structure of the gender
wage gap in transition. Equally importantly, the results presented below also allow for a comparison
of gender segregation and wages in Eastern Europe to that described by Ogloblin (1999) for Russia.
3. Data
The data come from national employer surveys, called Information System on Average Earnings
(ISAE), in which ￿rms report hourly wages of their employees.6 (Both countries also conduct
household surveys of individuals, but these Labor Force Surveys do not ask about wages.) For
each ￿rm, the data includes the industry of operation and the ￿rm￿s ownership type (private, state,
foreign, or mixed), while the region of operation is recorded separately for each establishment of a
multi-unit ￿rm. Only ￿rms with more than 10 employees are covered in the sample. Participating
￿rms report hourly wages, gender, education, age, and a detailed occupational classi￿cation (based
6The surveys, included by the Czech and Slovak Statistical Oﬃces among the national obligatory inquiries, are
collected by a private agency on behalf of the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs and the Slovak Ministry of
Labor, Social Aﬀairs and Family. They are compatible with the European Earnings Cost Index and are coordinated
by the European Statistical Oﬃce.
5on the International Standard Classi￿cation of Occupations 1988) for all workers they employ except
top management. The data records are drawn directly from companies￿ personnel databases using
software developed by the data-collection agencies. Having available a measure of hourly wage
rates is ideal for the purpose of estimating diﬀerences in the pay of men and women because of the
gender diﬀerences in hours worked. Furthermore, the de￿nition of hourly wage is detailed and fully
consistent across ￿rms.7 The uniformity of the wage de￿nition and the use of personnel records,
minimizing the extent of reporting errors, make the data unique at least in the transition context.
The data obtained for the analysis consists of employees from participating ￿rms from the ￿rst
quarter of 1998 for the Czech Republic and a randomly drawn one-in-three sub-sample of employees
from Slovak ￿rms from the third quarter of 1998. The original ISAE samples from this period cover
approximately 35 and 22% of the entire Czech and Slovak enterprise employment respectively. In
the Czech Republic, the sample includes 1614 ￿rms and establishments, which form a total of 999
￿rms, some multi-unit. In the Slovak sample, there are 658 ￿rms, consisting of 735 ￿rms and their
establishments.8
Participating ￿rms were drawn randomly within sampling strata, de￿ned by the product of an
industry classi￿cation and employment-size categories. However, the strata-speci￿c population cov-
erage, de￿ned as the ratio of the number of sampled establishments to the number of establishments
in the economy within a given sampling strata, is the result of a number of discretionary decisions
on the part of the data collection agencies. Collection of this data began in 1993 when the sample
contained a few large ￿rms. The samples were gradually enlarged in each country by random sam-
pling in strata where coverage was relatively low. This is far from an ideal sampling strategy. It
under-represents newly born ￿rms and does not fully correspond to modern probability sampling
7Each quarter, employers in the Czech and Slovak Republics are legally required to calculate for each worker
an average hourly wage, de￿ned as total cash compensation including bonuses and other special payments divided
by total hours worked for that quarter. This average wage is then used for calculating sickness and unemployment
bene￿ts.
8A majority of the establishments belong to a few large public or state-owned ￿rms, such as the national railroads.
6procedures. The resulting samples lack representativeness with respect to both sampling criteria:
the industrial structure and size. The structure of each sample is presented in the appendix Tables
A-1 and A-2. The composition of the data is weighted toward large establishments and manufac-
turing industries, similar to the matched employer-employee data used by Bayard et al. (1999).9
The data covers, however, essentially all industries and occupations in both countries. The ISAE
samples not only provide the only source of recent wage information in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, but to my knowledge, they are also the only matched employer-employee data from any
transition country.
To recover population statistics as closely as possible, weights re￿ecting the sampling procedure
were calculated by dividing the population frequency of ￿rms within strata cells by the corresponding
sample frequency.10 The population distribution is based on end-of-year ￿rm registers, which are
compiled by the Statistical Oﬃces of each country and contain summary information on all existing
￿rms in the economy.11 The ￿rm registers are also used as sampling frames by the data collection
agencies. Unfortunately, the registers appear to be of problematic quality for the smallest ￿rm-size
categories. (Revised statistics are often published with signi￿cant delay, which diﬀer greatly from
the originally published results.) Further, the ISAE samples include only a very small fraction
of existing ￿rms with fewer than 100 employees. The analysis is therefore based on a sample of
￿rms employing more than 100 workers, containing 726,635 workers in 663 Czech ￿rms and 112,698
workers in 443 Slovak ￿rms.
Much of the analysis conditions on the workers￿ attained education level,12 which is however
9See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) who provide a survey of the existing matched employer-employee data sets.
10For Slovakia, I also had access to population employment ￿gures by strata. Weights based on strata employment
were fully comparable, however, to weights based on the strata-speci￿cn u m b e ro f￿rms. For the Czech Republic,
only the ￿rm frequencies are available; therefore, I use the ￿r m - l e v e lw e i g h t si nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
11For the Czech Republic, I use the 1997 register to approximate the population of ￿rms in the ￿rst quarter of
1998. For Slovakia, the 1998 register is used to approximate the 3rd quarter 1998 population.
12As with most other data from transition economies, education is reported as the highest degree obtained rather
than as years of schooling actually attended. See Filer et al. (1999) for a brief description of the Czech and Slovak
7missing for a large fraction of workers (25% in Czech and 12% in Slovak data). Education has
therefore been imputed based on the in-sample information. Five broad educational attainment
categories were formed and the most frequent value for those workers reporting education within
4-digit occupational categories has been assigned as the predicted value separately for each sex and
country. The gender mean wage diﬀerences by education degree based on either the reported or
the imputed measure of education are in most cases almost identical.
Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3 compare weighted and unweighted means based on the ISAE
data. Weighting in most cases lowers the mean wage estimate as more weight is given to smaller
￿rms, which pay lower wages. The average hourly wage in the Czech non-public sector decreases
by about 6 Czech Crowns (CZK) for both sexes as a result of weighting. The eﬀect is smaller in
the Czech public sector and Slovak non-public sector and is actually reversed for public wages in
Slovakia, where coverage is much lower than elsewhere. Except for ￿rm total employment, which
corresponds to one of the weighting dimensions, other variables are little aﬀected by weighting.
Comparing the two economies, the diﬀerences in educational attainment and other characteris-
tics are relatively minor. (Both countries were part of a federation until 1993 and shared the same
institutional infrastructure.) There are more private ￿rms in the Czech economy, however, and a
relatively larger portion of Slovak employment is in state-owned business. This re￿ects the general
progress of marked-oriented transformation in the two countries (see Svejnar, 1999).
4. Econometric Approach
A vast literature aimed at measuring the extent of wage discrimination has followed Oaxaca (1973)
in decomposing the overall mean wage diﬀerence between the advantaged (men) and disadvantaged
(women) into two parts: the ￿rst re￿ecting the diﬀerence in average productive endowments of
individuals in each group and the second part due to the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients. Following this
approach, one ￿rst estimates logarithmic wage regressions separately for each gender, controlling
educational system and its several paths that students may follow.
8for explanatory variables. The decomposition technique relies on the fact that the ￿tted regressions
pass through the sample means as follows:
lnwj = c βj
0
Xj,j ∈ {f,m}, (1)
where f denotes females and m denotes males, lnwj is the gender-speci￿cm e a no ft h en a t u r a ll o g a -
rithm of hourly wage, and where Xj represents the respective vectors of mean values of explanatory
variables for men and women. Finally, c βm and c βf are the corresponding vectors of estimated
coeﬃcients. A general form of the mean wage decomposition is as follows:
lnwm − lnwf =( Xm − Xf)
0e β +[ Xm
0
(c βm − e β)+Xf
0
(e β − c βf)], (2)
where e β represents a counter-factual non-discriminatory wage structure. The ￿rst term on the right
hand side of equation 2 represents that part of the total logarithmic wage diﬀerence which stems
from the diﬀerence in average productive characteristics across gender. The second term originates
in the diﬀerences in gender-speci￿cc o e ﬃcients from the non-discriminatory wage structure and is
often interpreted as re￿ecting wage discrimination.13
There are a number of variants of this method depending on how one simulates the non-
discriminatory wage structure. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) suggest the use of regression coeﬃcients
obtained by estimating a wage regression on a pooled data-set including both men and women, ar-
guing that they provide a good estimate of a competitive non-discriminatory norm. I follow their
suggestion and estimate standard logarithmic wage regressions of the following form:




ijγ + †ij, with i =1 ,...N j, and j =1 ,...,J, (3)
where wij denotes the hourly wage of the i- t hw o r k e ri nt h ej-th ￿rm, and where Fij =1if the
worker is female and equals 0 otherwise. J denotes the number of ￿rms in the sample and Nj is the
13There have been objections to this decomposition approach. First, by focusing on the mean gap, it ignores
meaningful diﬀerences in gender-speci￿c wage distributions. Second, if characteristics which might diﬀer between
males and females are omitted in the vector of regressors, the contribution of these characteristics will be captured
by the constant term and will erroneously appear in the measure of discrimination.
9number of workers in the j-th ￿rm. Following Groshen (1991) and Bayard et al. (1999), the eﬀect
of gender segregation on wages is captured by conditioning on the ￿femaleness￿ of occupations,
establishments, and job cells. ￿Femaleness￿ is then measured by the percent of females (P)i na
given group of employees: the elements of the Pij vector are the fraction of female employment in
the ij-th worker￿s occupation, ￿rm, and job cell.
Under the assumption of equality of male and female coeﬃcients (βm = βf = e β), the estimated
female eﬀect b α can be interpreted as the pure (percentage) eﬀect of gender on wages to the extent
that the eﬀect of other characteristics have been accounted for by the vector Xij, which consists
of all other observed worker and ￿rm speci￿c characteristics. Most of the results presented below
are based on the pooled speci￿cation, which is used for wage gap decompositions, but I also report
parameters of interest from key speci￿cations run separately for men and women.
The speci￿c nature of the sampling procedure discussed in Section 3 results in a lack of repre-
sentativeness of the ISAE data across strata. For instance, small ￿rms, which typically pay lower
wages, are relatively under-represented in the samples. To the extent that wage setting diﬀers across
strata, this lack of representativeness should be re￿ected in calculating mean wages (and mean wage
diﬀerences between men and women) by properly re-weighting means from each strata. Weighting
in regression, however, is not only an old but also a controversial topic.14 Under the assumption
that regression coeﬃcients are identical across strata, both OLS and WLS (weighted least squares)
estimators are consistent, and OLS is eﬃcient. If the parameter vectors diﬀe rf o re a c hs a m p l i n g




) from equation 3, a regression slope estimator








s b V (b δs), (4)
where Ws = n−1ns are weights re￿ecting the population shares of employees in each strata,15 and
14The following discussion relies heavily on Deaton (1997, pp. 67-72).
15The population counts of employees by strata are not available for the ISAE data and they have to be constructed
from the population number of ￿rms by strata, Ns. Denoting the sample values of the strata-speci￿cn u m b e ro f￿rms
10where b δs is an OLS estimate based on observations from stratum s.

























which is in general not consistent for the weighted average of the strata parameters δ. Here, f Ws =
(f ns)
−1 ns, where f ns represents the sample values of the strata-speci￿cn u m b e ro fe m p l o y e e s ,Zs is
the data matrix for stratum s conformable to the de￿nition of δ given above, and lnws is the column
vector of lnwij for i,j ∈ s. Note that the WLS regression weights the strata-speci￿cc o e ﬃcient b δs
not only by f Ws, but also by matrix weights Z
0
sZs corresponding to the precision of b δs.T h eW L S
estimator is consistent for δ if the parameter variation across strata is independent of the moment
matrices and if the number of strata is large (see, e.g., Deaton, 1997, p. 70).
Each ISAE strata can be thought of as an independent survey, albeit sampled cumulatively
over time, but the extent of sampling across strata (and the precision of each b δs)i sa dh o c .T h i s
may aﬀect the WLS estimator. Further, Pesaran et al. (2000) note that neglecting coeﬃcient
heterogeneity can result in signi￿cant estimates of incorrectly included regressors and bias other
parameters even if the erroneously included variables are orthogonal to the true regressors. One
may therefore be interested in testing for the presence of parameter heterogeneity. Such tests are
b a s e do nc o m p a r i n gb δWLS with b δOLS estimated oﬀ pooled unweighted data. Both estimators will
be consistent in the absence of heterogeneity, but they will diﬀer if parameters vary across strata. A
version of the test based on Hausman (1978) can be conducted by running an auxiliary regression,
lnws = Zsθ + f WsZsλ + v, with s =1 ,...,S, (6)
and testing the null hypothesis H0 : λ =0 . (With hundreds of thousands of data points, it is very
likely that any hypothesis will be rejected.)
In the subsequent analysis, I present two types of regression estimates. The ￿rst is based on




Nsf ns and b n =
P
s c ns.
11a traditional WLS regression estimated using pooled data from all strata. The second is based on
equation 4, which I refer to as split-sample weighting. The calculation of standard errors for both
sets of results allows for any form of unconditional heteroscedasticity as well as interdependence
of error terms within ￿rms. This is important because person speci￿c error terms will not be
independent within ￿rms in matched employer-employee data such as the ISAE. To capture this
￿rm-level clustering I use a panel data version of the Huber/White estimator:
















where b †sj =l n wsj − Zsjb δs i st h ec o l u m nv e c t o ro fe s t i m a t e de r r o rt e r m sf o re m p l o y e e so ft h ej-
th establishment in stratum s. (The subscript s is dropped when calculating the WLS variance
covariance matrix.)
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive Evidence on Wage Gap and Segregation
The simplest comparison of male and female wages conditions on only one explanatory characteristic
at a time. The top panel of Table 1 oﬀe r ss u c hc o m p a r i s o n ,b a s e do nw e i g h t e dd a t ai ne a c hc o u n t r y
and sector. Each table entry is a percentage mean-wage disadvantage of women for a particular
worker or ￿rm category. There appears to be a lower mean gender wage gap for workers with only
primary education (representing 8 to 9 years of schooling), except for the Slovak public sector,
where relatively little data is included in the sample. Further, higher age seems to imply larger
gender pay diﬀerentials, except for workers above 50 years of age. The overall gap is smallest for
employees of cooperatives in both countries and higher in all ownership categories in the Czech
Republic compared to Slovakia. There does not appear to be a strong pattern with respect to ￿rm
size, except perhaps for the presence of somewhat lower pay gaps in smaller ￿rms.
While these results may be interesting, they do not provide enough guidance for policy purposes
since they do not point to the sources of the gender pay diﬀerences. One of these potential sources
12is gender segregation, which is measured in this paper by the fraction of females in a particular
occupation, ￿rm, or job cell (de￿ned as a group of workers with the same occupation within a
￿rm). Further, to capture the extent to which women are employed as supervisors, the fraction of
females among each ￿rms￿ supervisory workforce is also calculated. (This statistic is of additional
interest as female supervisors may be able to lower the overall pay gap within the ￿rms they work
for.) A detailed picture of gender employment segregation is oﬀered in Figures 1 to 3, where the
weighted-sample distribution of the fraction-female statistics is plotted for each sector. (The mean
values of the fraction-female statistics are reported in appendix Tables A-3 and A-4.) However,
note that the strongest segregation of female and male employment occurs across sectors. As the
bottom panel of Table 1 reports, the public sector employs more than 3 times as many women as
men in both countries. While there are more men than women working in the non-public sector,
the ratio is not as dramatic.
Figure 1 compares the distribution of the fraction of female employment in 27 2-digit occupations
across sectors and countries.16 The overall pattern is remarkably similar in the two economies. In
the public sectors, very few workers are employed in occupations where less than a half of the
employees are women. In the non-public sectors, the distribution of ￿femaleness￿ of occupations
is relatively uniform. This is in stark contrast to a hypothetical segregation-free distribution. If
the sample workers were assigned randomly to occupations (and sectors), the distribution would
collapse around the fraction female in the whole sample, which is about 45% in both countries after
weighting and combining the two sectors.
The distribution of segregation of men and women into diﬀerent ￿rms is captured in Figure 2.
Again, the two countries appear very similar with respect to this measure of workplace segregation,
although in the public sector, the Czech distribution is more skewed toward ￿female￿ ￿rms. Again,
16In the Czech Republic, I was also able to form an occupational segregation measure using the 1996 Microcensus
dataset, which is a household survey conducted by the Czech Statistical Oﬃce every four years. It includes 12
thousand employed women and 13 thousand employed men, for whom the mean values of the fraction female in
2-digit occupation in 1996 are 0.648 and 0.330 respectively, quite comparable to the ISAE statistics for 1998.
13given the large average ￿rm size in the sample, random assignment of workers to these ￿rms would
result in almost all workers being employed in ￿rms where 45% of employees are women.
Job-cell segregation appears to be quite intense in Figure 3, in that about a third of public-sector
workers in both countries works in job cells where almost all employees are women. Furthermore,
despite the relatively uniform distribution of occupational segregation in the non-public sectors,
large spikes appears in the non-public job-cell distributions as about 25% of workers are employed in
almost fully ￿male￿ job cells. These spikes are preserved when only job cells with 10 or more workers
are used in generating the distributions since less then 10% of workers in the Slovak data and about
3% of Czech-sample employees work in such small job cells.17 Superimposed on the histograms
of job-cell segregation are simulated distributions based on random assignment of sample workers
to job cells.18 The comparison to these segregation-free distributions points to signi￿cant gender
segmentation of job cells.
5.2. Accounting for the Wage Gap
The fraction-female measures will later be used to account for a part of the overall gender pay gap.
But ￿rst, I will explore the standard human capital explanations, as well as sources of the pay
diﬀerences that are linked to ￿rm characteristics. The simple wage comparisons presented in Table
1 fail to point to the source of the female/male wage gap. The subsequent analysis will therefore be
based on logarithmic wage regressions, gradually expanding the set of explanatory variables. Table
2 presents the estimates of the female dummy from a sequence of speci￿cations. In column (1), the
female dummy estimate is reported based on a regression where no other explanatory variables are
used. This overall, WLS logarithmic wage gap is about 0.24 in the Czech public sector and almost
0.30 in the Czech non-budgetary sector. The size of the diﬀerence between the two gaps suggests
17Recall that the Slovak data consists of a random one-in-three subsample of workers from participating ￿rms.
18These distributions are simulated by taking the sexes￿ overall sample shares and the sample size distribution of
job cells as given. Unlike in the case of ￿rm and occupational segregation, the job-cell distributions do not nearly
c o l l a p s eo nt h ef r a c t i o no fw o m e ni nt h es a m p l e .T h i si sc a u s e db yt h es m a l l e rn u m b e ro fw o r k e r sp e rj o bc e l l .
14that the primary cause of the Czech wage gap does not have to do with the division of labor between
the low-paying budgetary and high-paying entrepreneurial sectors as one might expect in light of
t h ed r a m a t i cd i ﬀerence in the female fraction of employment in each sector. The unadjusted WLS
gap is substantially smaller in Slovakia: 0.15 in the public sector and about 0.23 elsewhere.
The next question is how much of the logarithmic wage gap (represented by the female dummy)
can be accounted for by gender diﬀerences in workers￿ productive characteristics? In column (2),
I therefore condition on workers￿ age and education. This reduces the WLS estimate of the Czech
public-sector female dummy by about 6 percentage points as women are more likely to have sec-
ondary education, while the fraction of college educated is higher for men (see Table A-3 for more
details and recall that the wage grids used in the budgetary sector cement the dependence of wages
on education). In Slovakia￿s public sector, the reduction in the female dummy estimate is even
more pronounced and results in a strikingly low coeﬃcient of about 0.08. This is again due to
an unevenly high fraction of college educated male public employees. In contrast, the wage gap
is actually increased by conditioning on human capital characteristics in both the Czech and Slo-
vak non-budgetary sectors, as the overall distribution of education degrees is mildly favorable for
women. (A similar result was obtained by Ogloblin, 1999.)
Ogloblin (1999) suggests that most of the Russian gender pay gap can be explained by condi-
tioning on industrial and ownership dummies, as well as on the extent of segregation by occupation.
Column (3) of Table 2 reports a speci￿cation exploring the ￿r s th a l fo fh i s￿nding for the Czech
and Slovak Republics. It appears that controlling for a quadratic in ￿rm size (employment) as
well as for a set of dummy variables re￿ecting 2-digit industrial classi￿cation, ownership type, and
geographical location of the ￿rm or its establishment does not take away most of the female dummy
estimate. In both of the Czech sectors, and in the Slovak non-public economy, the reduction in the
unweighted female dummy is about 3 to 4 percentage points.
Further evidence on how much of the gender wage gap is due to between- as opposed to within-
establishment components is presented in column (4) of Table 2. This speci￿cation includes not
15only worker-speci￿c productive characteristics, but also a set of ￿rm ￿xed eﬀects.19 The female
dummy estimates change little. It appears that the ￿rm-level controls used in the previous columns
captured most of the ￿rms￿ impact on gender pay diﬀerences in all four sectors. In summary,
employer identity plays a secondary but still an important role in the determination of the gender
pay gap in both countries.
The ￿rst columns of both the Czech and Slovak panel of Table 3 explore the extent to which
occupational segregation drives the gender wage diﬀerences by conditioning on the percent of female
employment within the 2-digit occupational classi￿cation as well as on all workers￿ and ￿rms￿ char-
acteristics. Occupational segregation in all cases except for the Slovak public sector signi￿cantly
lowers both female and male wages in occupations, where a larger fraction of women is employed.
The Czech female dummy coeﬃcients are reduced as a result of introducing the occupational seg-
regation measure by about 2 to 4 percent, while the decrease in the Slovak estimates is negligible.
These results therefore suggest that occupational segregation is not the primary source of wage
diﬀerences between men and women in Central European transition economies, in stark contrast to
Ogloblin￿s (1999) analysis of Russian wages.20
Columns (2) and (8) of Table 3 ask whether occupational segregation aﬀects wages across ￿rms
or within ￿rms. The newly introduced regressor captures the percent of female employment within
narrowly de￿ned job cells. The regression estimates suggest that job cell segregation is at least as
important as occupational segregation as it further lowers the female dummy coeﬃcient estimate
and in one case drives the occupational coeﬃcient out of statistical signi￿cance.
The ISAE samples cover 27 2-digit occupations in both countries, while at the 4-digit level,
19See Carrington and Troske (1998) for a similar analysis conducted for U.S. manufacturing, where a large portion
of the wage gap can be explained by controlling for employer identity.
20Ogloblin (1999) does not use fraction-female controls, but captures occupational segregation by including ￿fteen
occupational dummy variables capturing 4-digit occupations within each one-digit occupational group which have
more than 70% of either female or male workers. Including such dummy variables into the speci￿cations with female-
fraction controls in Table 3 has a negligible eﬀect on the estimates.
16there are 541 occupations in the Czech data and 497 in the Slovak sample. The choice of the
2-digit occupational classi￿cation for capturing segregation is relatively arbitrary. In particular,
segregation measures based on a more detailed classi￿cation suggest more segregation (see Tables
A-3 and A-4). Columns (3) and (9) therefore oﬀer a direct comparison to columns (2) and (8)
by estimating the same speci￿cation, but using a 4-digit occupational classi￿cation for calculating
segregation measures. Even though some of the coeﬃcients change, the qualitative results remain
unaﬀected; therefore, I proceed with the 2-digit classi￿cation.
The richest speci￿cation is presented in columns (4) and (10), where a ￿rm-level segregation
measure is added to the list of covariates, together with the fraction of females among each ￿rm￿s
supervisory workers.21 In both sectors of the Czech economy, the female dummy and the job-cell
segregation coeﬃcient are statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level, and the ￿rm-level segregation
parameter is signi￿cant in the non-public sector. In the Slovak public sector, both the negative
eﬀect of job cell segregation and the positive coeﬃcient of the female fraction of the supervisory
workforce are signi￿cant, together with the female dummy. In the Slovak non-public sector, on
the other hand, the important eﬀects appear to be those of occupational and job-cell segregation.
Further, note that in both public sectors, over one third of the original female dummy coeﬃcient
from column (1) of Table 2 remains after conditioning on all forms of segregation as well as on all
other available explanatory characteristics. This ￿unexplained￿ fraction reaches about two thirds in
both the Czech and Slovak non-public sectors, suggesting that potential violations of the equal pay
provision are much more important outside of the budgetary sectors. In Slovakia￿s public sector,
the female dummy estimate of column (7) is less than one quarter of the total pay gap, suggesting
very little scope for gender pay discrimination. Unfortunately, the ISAE data does not provide full
coverage of the Slovak public sector, so this result, while interesting, should be given less weight in
terms of policy implications than the estimates from the other three sectors.
21No supervisory workforce was reported for a fraction of ￿rms and these ￿rms were omitted from the subsequent
analysis. This lack of data on supervisors may be a result of ￿rms not reporting on their top management and/or
miscoding the occupational classi￿cation.
17Similar to the data used by Ogloblin (1999) in Russia, the Czech and Slovak ISAE surveys do
not include information on actual length of labor market experience and/or the number of children.
It is therefore impossible to accurately capture the diﬀerent labor market experience of men and
women22 and to control for important productivity-related characteristics. This is most likely to
b i a st h ef e m a l ed u m m yc o e ﬃcient upward. Maternity-related gender diﬀerences in labor market
experience can be expected to be smallest for both older cohorts of workers, where the eﬀect of
previous labor market interruptions may already be wiped out, and younger cohorts, which have
had relatively few leaves from the labor market.23 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e s eg e n d e rd i ﬀerences are
presumably lower in the younger and older cohorts, I attempt to minimize the maternity-related
bias by separately estimating the preferred speci￿cation (columns 4 and 10 of Table 3) for workers
aged over 45 and under 25. These results are presented in the remaining columns of Table 3. The
female dummy estimates based on the older workers are only somewhat lower than the overall
results. The results for the younger cohort, however, oﬀer a very diﬀerent picture, especially in
the Slovak public sector, where the scope for equal pay act violations is eliminated. There are two
potential explanations for these results. Younger women may be paid relatively more equally to
men as a result of having had fewer labor market interruptions. Alternatively, their career paths
and remuneration practices may diﬀer fundamentally from those of older women who had spent
most of their working life under communism. The second explanation is particularly interesting
and deserves further attention in future research.
In Slovakia, only a random one-in-three subsample of workers from surveyed ￿rms was used
in the analysis. This implies that the segregation measures, especially those related to individual
￿rms, may be measured with error (see Bayard et al., 1999). Therefore, I also compare the female
22Women in the Czech and Slovak Republics rely on an extensive public system of child-care, generous family
allowances, and guaranteed maternity leaves of up to 3 years.
23During transition, young women became more likely to substitute careers for early motherhood. Between 1993
and 1997, the number of children born per 1000 women aged 20-24 decreased from 145.6 to 85.5 in the Czech Republic
and from 166.7 to 106.2 in Slovakia (Charles University, 1999; Slovak Statistical Oﬃce, 1998).
18dummy coeﬃcient from the preferred speci￿cation of columns (4) and (10) of Table 3 to its estimate
from a job-cell ￿xed eﬀect speci￿cation from column (5) of Table 2. Job cell ￿xed eﬀects absorb all
industry, occupation, and ￿rm eﬀects and account for any form of segregation in a fully unrestricted
fashion. The female dummy estimates from the job-cell ￿xed eﬀect speci￿cations are only somewhat
larger, suggesting a minor eﬀect of measurement error.
It was argued in Section 4 that the WLS estimator imposes the parameter variation across
strata to be independent of the data moment matrices. To assess the sensitivity of the estimates
to this assumption I compare the WLS estimates to alternative results based on the split-sample
weighting procedure (see Equation 4). The Hausman-type test for presence of important parameter
heterogeneity across strata (based on Equation 6 and using estimates of the covariance matrix from
Equation 7) signals the need for weighting in every estimated speci￿cation.24 The split-sample
weighting estimates are presented in Table A-5. All of the female dummy coeﬃcients are somewhat
lower, compared to the WLS results, but the changes across speci￿cations mirror the pattern of the
WLS estimates. Furthermore, the richest speci￿cation estimable using the split-sample procedure
in column (6) of Table A-5 is fully comparable to the preferred WLS speci￿cation in columns (4)
a n d( 1 0 )o fT a b l e3 . 25
While the pooled speci￿cations estimated above will be used below in the wage gap decomposi-
tions, it is interesting to compare the eﬀects of segregation on wages across gender. The equality of
coeﬃcients across gender is relaxed in Table A-6, which presents the coeﬃcients on the fraction fe-
male within each employment category. Most of the estimated segregation eﬀects in the non-public
sectors are similar for men and women (relative to the size of standard errors), which is in contrast
to the ￿ndings of Bayard et al. (1999) for the U.S. On the other hand, there are larger diﬀerences in
24The test is highly statistically signi￿cant in every speci￿cation and sector; therefore, I do not report the test
values. They are available upon request.
25Note that estimating a full set of the ￿rm-speci￿cc o e ﬃcients using the split-sample weighting procedure is
infeasible due to the small number of ￿rms within many strata (see Tables A-1 and A-2). In most of the split-sample
speci￿cations I therefore condition on a set of ￿rm ￿xed eﬀects.
19the public sectors. For example, the signi￿cantly estimated positive eﬀect of the fraction of female
supervisors within ￿rms in the Slovak public sector is much larger for women than for men.
5.3. Decomposing the Wage Gap
The sensitivity tests given above do not reject columns (4) and (10) of Table 3 as a preferred
speci￿cation; therefore, I use it in all four sectors to calculate a mean wage decomposition. Table
4 reports the decomposition results based on equation 2 for the Czech public sector. The ￿rst
column lists the unadjusted overall pay gap from the ￿rst column of Table 2, while column (2) of
Table 4 reports most of the parameter estimates from the speci￿cation reported in column (4) of
Table 3. Over a third of the overall gender wage gap is due to gender diﬀerences in wages that
remain after controlling for all available explanatory characteristics. Another third is explained
by the segregation of women into low-paying occupations and job cells. Finally, the last third of
the pay gap is attributable to the uneven distribution of education among men and women in the
Czech budgetary sector. Speci￿cally, men are much more likely to have a university education than
women.
As mentioned earlier, the picture is dramatically diﬀerent in both the Czech and Slovak non-
public sector (see Tables 5 and 7). Here, almost two thirds of the overall pay gap remain unexplained
by other factors and the potential scope for gender pay discrimination appears high. If all of this
female dummy estimate was due to discrimination, female wages would be raised by about one
￿fth through full compliance with the equal pay act. A substantial part of this unexplained gap
is, however, likely to be due to maternity-related diﬀerences in the labor market experience of men
and women, which none of the estimated regressions controls for.
Similar to the results for the Czech public sector, the decompositions in Table 5 and 7 suggest
that employment segregation is related to over one third of the total gender pay gap in Czech and
Slovak non-public employment. The channels of the eﬀect are diﬀerent, though, between the two
countries. While in the Slovak non-public sector, it is the occupational and job cell segregation
20that drives the pay wedge between genders, ￿rm-level segregation is equally important in the Czech
non-public sector. The wage impacts of gender diﬀerences in educational attainment average out
across the diﬀerent degrees to a negligible eﬀect. Other worker- or ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics also
attribute little to the mean wage diﬀerence between genders.
The overall gender pay diﬀerence, as well as the potential extent of pay discrimination are
lowest in the Slovak public sector as shown in Table 6, which also documents the relatively small
eﬀect of segregation on the female dummy estimate. Even though the coeﬃcient on the female
fraction among the ￿rm￿s supervisory workforce is statistically signi￿cant, its eﬀect on the mean
wage gap is relatively small. The largest part of the gap is attributable to a higher fraction of male
college-educated public employees. Unfortunately, the Slovak public-sector results are based on a
relatively small sample and in particular say little about gender pay diﬀerences in Slovakia￿s public
administration.
5.4. Cross-Country Comparison and Discussion
The analysis presented above naturally leads into three types of cross-country comparison.
First, one can compare the Czech results to Slovak. Overall, the structure of the gender wage
gap appears relatively similar across the two countries, but the extent of both gender segregation
and wage gap is smaller in Slovakia. The diﬀerences in female relative wages in two economies that
until recently formed one country calls for future research.26 It may be a consequence of the faster
26The comparison between the Czech and Slovak Republics is interesting for at least three reasons. First, until 1993
they formed a federation and shared a common institutional framework, currency, and legal system. Much of this
common institutional past remains in place and oﬀers a comparative laboratory which automatically controls for many
otherwise elusive country-speci￿c factors. Second, even though the two countries shared similar initial conditions, it
is generally acknowledged that transformation from central planning into a market economy (including privatization)
started earlier and progressed further in the Czech Republic (see Svejnar, 1999, and the references therein). Third,
the unemployment rates were much higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands from the outset of transition. (The
unemployment rates were 4.8% for Czech men and 7.3% for Czech women and 12.2% for Slovak men and 13.4% for
Slovak women in the sample-period quarters of 1998.) The comparison between these two countries is therefore one
between a rapid and successful reform and a sluggish transformation.
21free-market transformation of the Czech economy, where wage setting may have departed farther
from the communist wage grid. However, the decompositions suggest that little of the cross-country
diﬀerence in the gender wage gap is driven by diﬀerences in worker or ￿rm characteristics including
￿rm ownership, which represents the main observable diﬀerence in the characteristics of the two
economies.
Second, one can compare the present ￿ndings to those of Bayard et al. (1999) based on a similar
data set from the U.S. Apparently, the Czech, and to a lesser degree Slovak, gender segregation
and wage gap structure are quite similar to those of the U.S. The mean diﬀerence between women
and men in the fraction female in occupation (job cell) based on the highest level of occupational
disaggregation27 is 0.396 (0.744) in the U.S. while it is 0.460 (0.623) in the Czech non-public sector
and only 0.252 (0.489) in Slovak non-public ￿rms. The main diﬀerence in the structure of the wage
gap is in the importance of its unexplained part. In the non-public sectors of the Czech and Slovak
Republics, about two thirds of the wage gap is unexplained and potentially related to discrimination,
which compares unfavorably to less than one third in the U.S. (In the U.S., however, the overall
gap is larger at over 40%.) It is possible that this diﬀerence is driven by the lack of information in
the Czech and Slovak data on the number of children and labor market experience. The estimated
female dummy coeﬃcients for the youngest cohort are indeed lower than the all-sample estimate
and resemble the U.S. coeﬃcients.
Third, it is interesting to compare the conclusions of this research using enterprise employment
data from Eastern Europe to that based on household survey data from Russia. This comparison
is oﬀered in the concluding section.
Finally, it is important to note that the empirical ￿ndings of this paper are descriptive in their
nature. They identify the channels, by which segregation aﬀects gender wage diﬀerences, but not
the fundamental causes of segregation. One interpretation of the eﬀect segregation has on wages is
27In the U.S. data, one can distinguish 491 occupations while in the Czech (Slovak) samples, there are 541 (497)
occupational classes.
22employer discrimination in hiring and promotion. Another is suggested by Macpherson and Hirsh
(1995) who account for most of the wage eﬀect of occupational gender segregation in the U.S. by
conditioning on skill-related occupational characteristics and unmeasured skill or taste diﬀerences
of workers. They imply that the relative proportion of female employment in an occupation re￿ects
these characteristics and taste diﬀerences and should not be of major policy concern. However, as
argued in Ogloblin (1999), occupational segregation under central planning was to a large extent
the result of communist policies treating women as a ￿speci￿c labor force￿ and institutionalizing
gender segregation. Much of this legacy of communism remains visible in today￿s transition labor
markets.28 It is unlikely that central planners understood and re￿ected the fundamental taste
diﬀerences and unmeasured skills of their workers; therefore, occupational segregation in transition
c o u n t r i e si sr e l a t i v e l yu n l i k e l yt ob ed r i v e nm a i n l yb yu n o b s e r v a b l e s .
6. Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the channels through which gender segregation and an individual￿s sex
aﬀect the overall gender wage gap in the Czech and Slovak Republics. These countries, similar to
other transition economies aiming at joining the EU, are now in the process of enacting standard
western-style anti-discrimination labor market policies. The empirical results presented here provide
a measure of the potential eﬃcacy of these policies in reducing the overall gender pay diﬀerential.
By capturing the situation immediately before the anti-discrimination rules are legally enacted, the
present analysis also serves as a detailed benchmark for future measurement of the actual eﬀect of
the anti-discrimination eﬀorts in transition countries. Pre-accession countries provide a laboratory
where anti-discrimination laws are introduced at varying levels of development and where rich micro
data will often be available to observe the impact of all of these policies in detail.
28E.g., the overwhelming fraction of female employees in the budgetary sector. Further, the fraction of workers
employed in each major occupation group as well as the fraction of women within each of these groups was almost
constant between 1993 and 1998, when measured using the earliest and latest available wave of the Czech Labor Force
Survey. These results are available upon request.
23The initial evidence given here on hourly wage rates in Czech and Slovak medium and large
enterprises suggests that on average female wages are about 30% lower than male wages in the
Czech Republic. This diﬀerence is somewhat lower in the Czech budgetary sector. The gender
wage gap is generally lower in Slovakia and appears particularly low in the Slovak public sector.
A substantial part of the gender pay gap is attributable to diﬀerences in educational attainment
of men and women in the Czech and Slovak public sectors, where hiring and promotion practices
should be particularly easy to aﬀect.
The evidence on gender segregation implies that even though wages are typically lower in the
public sectors, which employ over three times as many women as men, this imbalance is not the
primary cause of the overall gender pay gap. Segregation of women into low-paying occupations,
￿rms and job cells appears responsible for over one third of the total wage gap. Furthermore, in
the non-public sectors of the Czech and Slovak Republics, about two thirds of the total wage gap
appears to be due to gender diﬀerences in wages that remain after accounting for most forms of
workplace segregation as well as for other explanatory variables. However, the estimated ￿pure￿
(unexplained) wage eﬀect of the individual￿s sex is likely to be aﬀected by the lack of information
in the Czech and Slovak data on the actual length of labor market experience and the number of
children.
The policy implications of these results are diﬀerent from those that Ogloblin (1999) presents
for Russia.29 In the Czech and Slovak Republics, it is not occupational segregation that is to blame
for most of the gender wage gap, but rather within-occupation within-establishment phenomena.
This implies a diﬀerent strategy for reducing the gender pay gap. Attention should not be paid
primarily to diﬀerences in remuneration across occupations (comparable worth policies), but rather
to potential within-establishment pay discrimination, especially violations of the equal pay clause.
29T h i sm a yb ei np a r tc a u s e db yt h ed i ﬀerent samples used in the two studies. While this paper relies on enterprise
employment in medium and large ￿rms, Ogloblin (1999) uses a household survey. On the other hand, this contrast
between the Russian ￿ndings and those for the Czech and Slovak Republics corroborates the diﬀerences between the
gender wage gap in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union painted by Brainerd (2000).
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32                                           Firm Employment 
Industry Category 
100 - 249  250 - 499 500 - 999 over 1000 Total
2,820 1,597 763 6,820 12,000
(17) (5) (1) (3) (26)
{116} {637} {124} {7} {884}
113 767 1,187 26,399 28,466
(1) (2) (2) (5) (10)
{12} {56} {33} {27} {128}
3,007 5,177 13,741 27,373 49,298
(17) (15) (19) (14) (65)
{77} {357} {146} {46} {626}
3,571 7,977 20,383 75,621 107,552
(21) (22) (29) (25) (97)
{59} {243} {105} {45} {452}
5,140 11,812 25,231 59,799 101,982
(30) (31) (34) (32) (127)
{95} {523} {230} {92} {940}
1,081 1,467 6,936 29,453 38,937
(6) (4) (10) (13) (33)
{11} {55} {28} {20} {114}
1,544 6,775 7,443 17,970 33,732
(11) (18) (11) (8) (48)
{54} {320} {116} {16} {506}
1,637 2,943 4,181 12,671 21,432
(10) (8) (6) (6) (30)
{40} {298} {111} {14} {463}
2,513 3,342 6,219 71,528 83,602
(18) (9) (11) (10) (48)
{22} {122} {50} {20} {214}
1,453 1,926 1,868 37,132 42,379
(9) (6) (3) (6) (24)
{9} {35} {8} {8} {60}
3,308 1,951 3,260 4,355 12,874
(22) (6) (5) (2) (35)
{58} {264} {75} {8} {405}
2,035 1,174 4,550 28,863 36,622
(12) (3) (6) (7) (28)
{33} {134} {37} {16} {220}
136 306 4,200 87,281 91,923
(1) (1) (5) (4) (11)
{67} {8} {10} {6} {91}
1,225 5,488 9,991 32,960 49,664
(7) (15) (14) (17) (53)
{36} {177} {90} {35} {338}
1,083 4,783 1,093 9,213 16,172
(7) (14) (2) (5) (28)
{38} {210} {54} {8} {310}
30,666 57,440 111,046 527,438 726,590
(189) (159) (158) (157) (663)
{727} {3439} {1217} {368} {5751}
Note: Boxed firms have been merged into a single strata to ensure presence of at least two firms per strata.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Mining, Quarrying, and Metalurgy
Food, Textile, and Leather
Table A-1: Czech ISAE Sample Description by Sampling Strata






Public Administration, and Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Hotels and Restaurants, Other Community, 
Social, and Personal Service Activities




Real Estate, R&D, Data Processing, and 
other Business Activities                                           Firm Employment 
Industry Category 
100 - 499 500 - 999 over 1000 Total
2,128 238 2,898 5,264
(24) (1) (4) (29)
{457} {8} {8} {473}
611 0 2,676 3,287
(7) (0) (1) (8)
{22} {4} {10} {36}
2,803 1,619 6,510 10,932
(33) (7) (10) (50)
{313} {43} {15} {371}
2,274 2,949 15,961 21,184
(25) (11) (20) (56)
{187} {22} {34} {243}
3,358 1,736 10,518 15,612
(41) (8) (15) (64)
{387} {52} {35} {474}
3,066 179 3,984 7,229
(42) (1) (5) (48)
{25} {5} {14} {44}
1,510 0 2,916 4,426
(20) (0) (4) (24)
{221} {5} {12} {238}
1,818 242 426 2,486
(21) (1) (1) (23)
{251} {18} {4} {273}
3,572 1,980 18,281 23,833
(43) (9) (12) (64)
{115} {9} {15} {139}
461 1,517 0 1,978
(5) (5) (0) (10)
{29} {6} {5} {40}
1,117 208 0 1,325
(15) (1) (0) (16)
{197} {9} {2} {208}
82 0 0 82
(2) (0) (0) (2)
{128} {35} {42} {205}
306 463 6,025 6,794
(4) (2) (9) (15)
{144} {22} {9} {175}
323 836 5,674 6,833
(4) (4) (10) (18)
{136} {33} {33} {202}
1,095 0 338 1,433
(15) (0) (1) (16)
{153} {8} {3} {164}
24,524 11,967 76,207 112,698
(301) (50) (92) (443)
{2765} {279} {241} {3285}
Note: Boxed firms have been merged into a single strata to ensure presence of at least two firms per strata.




Real Estate, R&D, Data Processing, and 
other Business Activities
Total
Public Administration, and Social Security
Education
Health and Social Work
Hotels and Restaurants, Other Community, 
Social, and Personal Service Activities
Table A-2: Slovak ISAE Sample Description by Sampling Strata
Number of Employees in Sample
*, (Number of Firms in Sample) , and {Number of Firms in Population}.
Paper and Chemicals
Machinery
*The data consists of a randomly drawn one-in-three sub-sample of employees from participating firms.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Mining, Quarrying, and Metalurgy
Food, Textile, and Leather
Utilities
ConstructionVariable Women Men Women Men
Hourly wage (CZK) 53.994 73.188 52.564 68.872
% female in 2-digit occupation 0.779 0.452 0.776 0.489
% female in 4-digit occupation 0.869 0.409 0.865 0.428
% female in firm 0.839 0.594 0.826 0.636
% female supervisors in firm 0.674 0.360 0.615 0.380
% female in 2-digit job cell 0.887 0.418 0.883 0.428
% female in 4-digit job cell 0.900 0.370 0.896 0.379
Age 38.840 36.018 38.876 35.664
Education   Primary  0.071 0.025 0.072 0.029
                   Secondary without GCE 0.175 0.184 0.169 0.206
                   Secondary with GCE 0.490 0.252 0.546 0.293
                   University  0.261 0.493 0.210 0.436
                   Post-graduate 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.037
Total employment in firm/1000  44.3 27.6 29.4 18.1
Prague (capital) 0.198 0.543 0.169 0.400
Number of workers 140,254 37,955 140,254 37,955
Number of firms 92 92 92 92
Hourly wage (CZK) 59.775 80.745 54.266 74.647
% female in 2-digit occupation 0.629 0.278 0.623 0.294
% female in 4-digit occupation 0.677 0.215 0.673 0.213
% female in firm 0.531 0.301 0.540 0.304
% female supervisors in firm 0.317 0.149 0.309 0.143
% female in 2-digit job cell 0.695 0.196 0.707 0.194
% female in 4-digit job cell 0.755 0.157 0.773 0.150
Age 38.551 38.809 38.096 38.265
Education   Primary  0.103 0.048 0.108 0.059
                   Secondary without GCE 0.403 0.580 0.465 0.604
                   Secondary with GCE 0.388 0.248 0.340 0.218
                   University  0.105 0.122 0.084 0.113
                   Post-graduate 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006
Total employment in firm/1000  5.102 5.911 2.202 2.836
Prague (capital) 0.278 0.208 0.224 0.184
Ownership Foreign 0.062 0.048 0.036 0.028
                  Private  0.625 0.617 0.655 0.702
                  Co-operative 0.036 0.013 0.115 0.061
                  State  0.271 0.314 0.188 0.201
                  Mixed 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.008
Number of workers 214,277 334,104 214,277 334,104
Number of firms 571 571 571 571
Table A-3: Means in Czech ISAE
Non-Public Sector
Public Sector
ISAE unweighted ISAE weightedVariable Women Men Women Men
Hourly wage (SKK) 47.065 58.925 51.107 61.441
% female in 2-digit occupation 0.660 0.498 0.664 0.497
% female in 4-digit occupation 0.784 0.473 0.797 0.463
% female in firm 0.788 0.706 0.795 0.712
% female supervisors in firm 0.708 0.603 0.696 0.608
% female in 2-digit job cell 0.851 0.496 0.865 0.469
% female in 4-digit job cell 0.867 0.444 0.884 0.405
Age 39.632 43.557 39.976 43.549
Education   Primary  0.119 0.056 0.107 0.052
                   Secondary without GCE 0.230 0.302 0.215 0.324
                   Secondary with GCE 0.470 0.201 0.519 0.215
                   University  0.163 0.319 0.145 0.275
                   Post-graduate 0.018 0.122 0.013 0.134
Total employment in firm/1000  1.840 2.147 0.924 0.965
Bratislava (capital) 0.190 0.290 0.150 0.250
Number of workers 10,543 3,166 10,543 3,166
Number of firms 35 35 35 35
Hourly wage (SKK) 55.331 71.177 52.111 66.273
% female in 2-digit occupation 0.558 0.280 0.567 0.315
% female in 4-digit occupation 0.631 0.221 0.628 0.245
% female in firm 0.506 0.293 0.512 0.301
% female supervisors in firm 0.394 0.240 0.415 0.261
% female in 2-digit job cell 0.679 0.190 0.684 0.195
% female in 4-digit job cell 0.741 0.154 0.743 0.159
Age 38.443 38.922 38.206 38.889
Education   Primary  0.165 0.088 0.170 0.094
                   Secondary without GCE 0.368 0.510 0.381 0.522
                   Secondary with GCE 0.403 0.326 0.382 0.292
                   University  0.063 0.074 0.066 0.089
                   Post-graduate 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
Total employment in firm/1000  2.458 3.403 1.289 1.910
Bratislava (capital) 0.147 0.144 0.174 0.137
Ownership Foreign 0.082 0.075 0.088 0.077
                  Private  0.365 0.348 0.421 0.421
                  Co-operative 0.029 0.015 0.090 0.060
                  State  0.453 0.475 0.334 0.340
                  Mixed 0.072 0.087 0.068 0.103
Number of workers 35,974 63,015 35,974 63,015
Number of firms 408 408 408 408
Non-Public Sector
Table A-4: Means in Slovak ISAE
ISAE weighted ISAE unweighted
Public Sector(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.208 * -0.150 * -0.147 * -0.100 * -0.120 * -0.101 *
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
% female in occupation ………… -0.181 * -0.124 *
(0.015) (0.025)
% female in job cell …………… -0.112 *
(0.024)
Number of workers 178,209 178,209 178,209 163,072 178,209 178,209
Number of firms 92 92 92 913
b 92 92
Female -0.269 * -0.285 * -0.255 * -0.197 * -0.223 * -0.189 *
(0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
% female in occupation ………… -0.140 * -0.034
(0.011) (0.019)
% female in job cell …………… -0.162 *
(0.017)
Number of workers 548,381 548,381 548,381 530,807 548,381 548,381
Number of firms 571 571 571 6648
b 571 571
Female -0.164 * -0.071 * -0.072 * -0.068 * -0.055 * -0.050 *
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
% female in occupation ………… -0.078 -0.067
(0.052) (0.049)
% female in job cell …………… -0.025
(0.046)
Number of workers 13,709 13,709 13,709 13,662 13,709 13,709
Number of firms 35 35 35 438
b 35 35
Female -0.208 * -0.216 * -0.186 * -0.162 * -0.158 * -0.147 *
(0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
% female in occupation ………… -0.124 * -0.097 *
(0.013) (0.018)
% female in job cell …………… -0.058 *
(0.016)
Number of workers 98,989 98,989 98,989 94,130 98,989 98,989
Number of firms 408 408 408 3832
b 408 408
Fixed effects No No Firm Job cell Firm Firm
Worker controls
a No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls
b No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
* statistically significant at the 1% level
Note: Standard errors in parenteses.
c Number of job cell fixed effects. For comparison with column (5) of Table 2, only observations where `% 
female supervisors in firm' is available are used.





a Worker's education degrees, age and age square. 
b Firm's employment and its square, ownership and 2-digit industry, establishment's region.Country
Sector
Gender Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.116 -0.106 * -0.184 * -0.063 -0.085 * -0.117 * 0.018 -0.027
(0.061) (0.038) (0.065) (0.039) (0.028) (0.031) (0.089) (0.078)
-0.132 -0.085 * -0.062 -0.22 * -0.07 * -0.064 * -0.004 -0.137
(0.053) (0.033) (0.054) (0.046) (0.024) (0.026) (0.074) (0.068)
-0.259 * -0.226 -0.123 0.063 -0.234 * -0.106 -0.445 * -0.298
(0.089) (0.099) (0.119) (0.102) (0.087) (0.075) (0.16) (0.146)
-0.013 -0.016 0.044 0.076 -0.129 * -0.070 0.151 * 0.326 *
(0.068) (0.046) (0.074) (0.061) (0.048) (0.043) (0.037) (0.074)
R-squared 0.464 0.453 0.552 0.575 0.465 0.457 0.698 0.660
Number of workers 323,306 207,501 35,018 128,054 59,323 34,807 3,154 10,508
Number of firms 522 527 71 71 390 385 34 34
* statistically significant at the 1% level
Table A-6:  Effects of Sex Segregation on Log Wages by Sex:  WLS Regression 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the following set of control variables: workers' education 
degrees, age and age square; firms' employment and its square, ownership and 2-digit industry, establishments' region. No 
fixed effects are used in any of the specifications
% female supervisors in firm
Non-public Public
Czech Republic Slovak Republic
% female in occupation
% female in job cell
% female in firm
Non-public PublicPublic Sector Non-public Sector Public Sector Non-public Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education   Primary  0.123 0.234 0.233 0.178
Secondary without GCE 0.179 0.269 0.078 0.239
Secondary with GCE 0.137 0.263 -0.062 0.187
University 0.163 0.327 0.165 0.200
Post-graduate 0.209 0.221 0.018 0.310
Age     -19 -0.026 0.142 -0.078 0.113
20-29 0.183 0.198 -0.022 0.180
30-39 0.301 0.301 0.093 0.219
40-49 0.286 0.292 0.213 0.221
50-59 0.195 0.270 0.215 0.222
60- -0.100 0.120 0.114 0.417
Ownership Foreign - 0.280 - 0.280
Private - 0.258 - 0.249
Co-operative - 0.211 - 0.116
State - 0.293 - 0.162
Mixed - 0.213 - 0.129
Public Sector 0.237 - 0.168 -
Firm size 100-249 Employees 0.223 0.237
250-499 Employees 0.172 0.250
500-999 Employees 0.209 0.267 0.206 0.254
Over 1000 Employees 0.268 0.285 0.181 0.233
0.787 0.391 0.769 0.363
Number of workers 178,209 548,381 13,709 98,989
Number of firms 92 571 35 408
Fraction of female employment by sector
Table 1: Weighted Means of Hourly Wage Differences by Gender  
0.171 0.135
Czech ISAE Slovak ISAE
Female wage disadvantage as fraction of male wage (1 - w f / w m)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.241 -0.180 -0.155 -0.156 -0.103
(0.044) (0.04) (0.021) (0.023) (0.006)
R-squared 0.073 0.571 0.586 0.621 0.726
Number of workers 178,209 178,209 178,209 178,209 163,072
Number of firms 92 92 92 92 913
c
-0.297 -0.315 -0.266 -0.247 -0.200
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
R-squared 0.107 0.385 0.490 0.596 0.715
Number of workers 548,381 548,381 548,381 548,381 530,807
Number of firms 571 571 571 571 6648
c
-0.152 -0.082 -0.076 -0.078 -0.069
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)
R-squared 0.025 0.530 0.653 0.676 0.823
Number of workers 13,709 13,709 13,709 13,709 13,662
Number of firms 35 35 35 35 438
c
-0.227 -0.231 -0.204 -0.179 -0.161
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
R-squared 0.064 0.287 0.476 0.600 0.703
Number of workers 98,989 98,989 98,989 98,989 94,130
Number of firms 408 408 408 408 3832
c
Fixed effects No No No Firm Job cell
Worker controls
a No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls
b No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenteses; all reported estimates statistically significant at the 1% level.
Female




a Worker's education degrees, age and age square. 
c Number of job cell fixed effects. For comparison with columns (4) and (10) of Table 3, only 





b Firm's employment and its square, ownership and 2-digit industry, establishment's region.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.126 * -0.102 * -0.092 * -0.092 * -0.086 * -0.078 * -0.073 * -0.058 * -0.052 * -0.060 * -0.043 * -0.009
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.022)
-0.162 * -0.101 * -0.045 -0.100 * -0.095 -0.106 -0.018 0.019 -0.151 0.006 -0.104 0.539 *
(0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.039) (0.061) (0.041) (0.053) (0.068) (0.056) (0.105) (0.103)
… -0.105 * -0.123 * -0.155 * -0.201 * -0.032 … -0.061 0.038 -0.057 -0.008 -0.272 *
(0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.046) (0.061) (0.039) (0.052) (0.044) (0.069) (0.080)
… … … 0.019 0.045 -0.004 … … … -0.352 * -0.259 -0.530 *
(0.110) (0.106) (0.137) (0.112) (0.158) (0.183)
… … … 0.075 0.100 0.009 … … … 0.301 * 0.221 * 0.471 *
(0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.056) (0.059) (0.095)
R-squared 0.591 0.593 0.592 0.597 0.606 0.442 0.653 0.654 0.657 0.668 0.685 0.500
Number of workers 178,209 178,209 178,209 163,072 61,011 24,108 13,709 13,709 13,709 13,662 5,348 1,588
Number of firms 92 92 92 71 71 71 35 35 35 34 34 34
-0.228 * -0.188 * -0.158 * -0.190 * -0.177 * -0.134 * -0.177 * -0.140 * -0.126 * -0.140 * -0.128 * -0.108 *
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
-0.152 * -0.058 -0.056 -0.104 -0.148 * -0.157 -0.136 * -0.072 * -0.081 * -0.098 * -0.146 * -0.006
(0.028) (0.049) (0.034) (0.048) (0.054) (0.061) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
… -0.160 * -0.162 * -0.104 * -0.112 -0.019 … -0.124 * -0.104 * -0.060 * -0.075 * -0.054
(0.040) (0.029) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
… … … -0.237 * -0.244 * -0.205 … … … -0.175 -0.118 -0.169
(0.085) (0.087) (0.097) (0.073) (0.078) (0.073)
… … … -0.014 -0.007 -0.030 … … … -0.103 -0.154 * -0.063
(0.048) (0.052) (0.053) (0.041) (0.048) (0.038)
R-squared 0.495 0.499 0.500 0.512 0.513 0.436 0.481 0.484 0.483 0.491 0.531 0.430
Number of workers 548,381 548,381 548,381 530,807 211,218 87,761 98,989 98,989 98,989 94,130 31,756 12,927
Number of firms 571 571 571 527 523 527 408 408 408 390 386 387
Occupational classification 2-digit 2-digit 4-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit 4-digit 2-digit 2-digit 2-digit
Age cohorts All All All All >45 <25 All All All All >45 <25
* statistically significant at the 1% level
Czech Non-Public Sector Slovak Non-Public Sector
Female
% female in firm
Czech Public Sector
% female supervisors in firm
Slovak Public Sector
Table 3:  Estimated Log Wage Differentials by Sex, and Percent Female in Occupation, Firm, Job Cell, and Supervisors within Firm:  WLS Regressions
Female
% female in occupation
% female in job cell
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include the following set of control variables: workers' education degrees, age and age square; firms' employment and its square, 
ownership and 2-digit industry, establishments' region. No fixed effects are used in any of the specifications.
% female in occupation
% female in job cell
% female in firm
% female supervisors in firmCoefficient 
estimate   
(1)
Coefficient 
estimate     
(2)
Mean difference 




wage gap, (2) x (3)
Relative contribution 
to wage gap 
(2)x(3)/(1)
-0.241 * -0.092 * 1.000 -0.092 0.382
(0.044) (0.007)
… -0.1 * 0.287 -0.029 0.118
(0.029)
… -0.155 * 0.455 -0.070 0.292
(0.041)
… 0.019 0.190 0.004 -0.015
(0.11)
… 0.075 0.235 0.018 -0.073
(0.062)
… 0.038 * 3.212 0.123 -0.509
(0.003)
… -0.036 * 1.470 -0.052 0.217
(0.003)
… 0.005 11.297 0.057 -0.234
(0.004)
… -0.005 12.084 -0.065 0.269
(0.005)
… 0.117 * -0.037 -0.004 0.018
(0.012)
… 0.494 * 0.253 0.125 -0.518
(0.017)
… 0.717 * -0.225 -0.162 0.670
(0.025)
… 0.893 * -0.034 -0.030 0.124
(0.028)
R-squared 0.094 0.632
Number of workers 178,209 163,072
Number of firms 92 71
Note: Column (1) comes from column (1) of Table 2; column (2) comes from column (4) of Table 3. The mean 
differences and coefficients for the regional and 2-digit industrial dummies are not reported but are included in 
the calculations.
Post-graduate education
% female in job cell
% female in firm








Secondary education with 
GCE
Table 4: Wage Gap Decomposition for Czech Public Sector
Female
% female in occupation
(Firm empl./10000)
2 Coefficient 
estimate   
(1)
Coefficient 
estimate     
(2)
Mean difference 




wage gap, (2) x (3)
Relative contribution 
to wage gap 
(2)x(3)/(1)
-0.297 * -0.19 * 1.000 -0.190 0.639
(0.014) (0.009)
… -0.104 0.328 -0.034 0.115
(0.048)
… -0.104 * 0.512 -0.053 0.180
(0.039)
… -0.237 * 0.236 -0.056 0.188
(0.085)
… -0.014 0.166 -0.002 0.008
(0.048)
… 0.031 * -0.169 -0.005 0.018
(0.001)
… -0.034 * -0.125 0.004 -0.014
(0.002)
… 0.009 -0.634 -0.006 0.020
(0.005)
… -0.015 -0.144 0.002 -0.007
(0.0001)
… 0.116 * -0.139 -0.016 0.054
(0.013)
… 0.386 * 0.122 0.047 -0.159
(0.012)
… 0.722 * -0.029 -0.021 0.069
(0.031)
… 0.852 * -0.004 -0.003 0.011
(0.049)
… -0.086 * -0.046 0.004 -0.013
(0.027)
… -0.232 * 0.054 -0.012 0.042
(0.052)
… -0.114 * -0.013 0.001 -0.005
(0.032)
… 0.025 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.082)
R-squared 0.107 0.501
Number of workers 548,381 530,807
Number of firms 571 527
Female
% female in occupation
% female in job cell
% female in firm





                   Co-operative
Ownership Private





Secondary education with 
GCE
                   State
                   Mixed
Note: Column (1) comes from column (1) of Table 2; column (2) comes from column (4) of Table 3. The mean 




estimate   
(1)
Coefficient 
estimate     
(2)
Mean difference 




wage gap, (2) x (3)
Relative contribution 
to wage gap 
(2)x(3)/(1)
-0.152 * -0.06 * 1.000 -0.060 0.395
(0.023) (0.014)
… 0.006 0.168 0.001 -0.007
(0.056)
… -0.057 0.396 -0.023 0.148
(0.044)
… -0.352 * 0.083 -0.029 0.191
(0.112)
… 0.301 * 0.088 0.027 -0.174
(0.056)
… 0.031 * -3.573 -0.110 0.718
(0.002)
… -0.029 * -3.452 0.101 -0.662
(0.003)
… -0.024 -0.040 0.001 -0.006
(0.038)
… 0.027 -0.111 -0.003 0.020
(0.023)
… 0.198 * -0.109 -0.022 0.142
(0.025)
… 0.465 * 0.304 0.141 -0.928
(0.027)
… 0.825 * -0.129 -0.107 0.701
(0.031)




Number of workers 13,709 13,662
Number of firms 35 34
Note: Column (1) comes from column (1) of Table 2; column (2) comes from column (10) of Table 3. The mean 









Table 6: Wage Gap Decomposition for Slovak Public Sector
Female
% female in occupation
(Firm empl./1000)
2 
% female in job cell
% female in firm





estimate   
(1)
Coefficient 
estimate     
(2)
Mean difference 




wage gap, (2) x (3)
Relative contribution 
to wage gap 
(2)x(3)/(1)
-0.227 * -0.14 * 1.000 -0.140 0.616
(0.014) (0.007)
… -0.098 * 0.252 -0.025 0.109
(0.025)
… -0.06 * 0.489 -0.029 0.130
(0.019)
… -0.1748 0.211 -0.037 0.162
(0.073)
… -0.1034 0.153 -0.016 0.070
(0.041)
… 0.036 * -0.684 -0.024 0.108
(0.002)
… -0.038 * -0.658 0.025 -0.111
(0.002)
… 0.066 * -0.621 -0.041 0.182
(0.011)
… -0.009 * -1.821 0.016 -0.069
(0.002)
… 0.085 * -0.141 -0.012 0.053
(0.01)
… 0.251 * 0.090 0.023 -0.099
(0.013)
… 0.631 * -0.023 -0.014 0.063
(0.032)
… 0.827 * -0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.079)
… -0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.046)
… -0.18 * 0.030 -0.005 0.024
(0.067)
… -0.157 * -0.006 0.001 -0.004
(0.049)
… -0.0304 -0.036 0.001 -0.005
(0.057)
R-squared 0.079 0.521
Number of workers 98,989 94,130
Number of firms 408 390
Note: Column (1) comes from column (1) of Table 2; column (2) comes from column (10) of Table 3. The mean 
differences and coefficients for the regional and 2-digit industrial dummies are not reported but are included in 
the calculations.
                   Mixed
Age squared
                   State
Ownership Private









Secondary education with 
GCE
% female in firm
% female supervisors in 
firm
Table 7: Wage Gap Decomposition for Slovak Non-public Sector
Female
% female in occupation
% female in job cell